Le président d'un des plus grands groupes d'opposition au nucléaire iranien, Gary Samore, démissionne et revoit ses positions
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/12/world/middleeast/head-of-group-opposing-iran-accord-quits-post-saying-he-backs-deal.html
Head of Group Opposing
Iran Accord Quits Post, Saying He Backs Deal
WASHINGTON —
When the bipartisan advocacy group United Against Nuclear Iran decided last
week to mobilize opposition against the nuclear deal with Tehran, Gary Samore
knew he could no longer serve as its president.
The reason:
After long study, Mr. Samore, a former nuclear adviser toPresident Obama, had
concluded that the accord was in the United States’ interest.
“I think
President Obama’s strategy succeeded,” said Mr. Samore, who left his post on
Monday. “He has created economic leverage and traded it away for Iranian
nuclear concessions.”
As soon as
Mr. Samore left, the group announced a new standard-bearer with a decidedly
different message: Joseph I. Lieberman, the former senator from Connecticut and
the new chairman of the group.
“It’s a bad
deal,” said Mr. Lieberman, who believes that lawmakers have a chance to block
the accord even if that means overcoming a presidential veto. “If the Iranians
are pressured more, I think we can get a better agreement.”
To get that
message across, the group has announced a multimillion-dollar television and
digital media campaign.
Yet it is Mr.
Samore’s quiet departure as president of the organization that is resonating
among the small community of experts who have pored over the agreement.
Mr. Samore
helped establish the organization in 2008, well before serious nuclear talks
were underway. The aim was to strengthen the international economic sanctions
againstIran, which Mr. Samore was
convinced had been mounting a clandestine effort to develop nuclear weapons.
Mr. Samore,
who traveled to Iran in 2005, is well known to the Iranians. At a dinner that
Mr. Samore attended during a meeting of the United Nations General Assembly in
2013, Mohammad Javad Zarif, Iran’s foreign minister, repeated assurances that
Iran’s nuclear efforts were entirely peaceful.
“We are all
united against a nuclear Iran,” he quipped, as he cast a glance at Mr. Samore.
Mr. Samore,
who now runs the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at
Harvard, initially said that the chances of a successful negotiation were dim.
But after the framework of an accord was announced in
Lausanne, Switzerland, in April, he praised it as a good first step.
Mark D.
Wallace, the chief executive of the group and a diplomat in the George W. Bush
administration, said that the organization’s members had sought to keep an open
mind. But after the final terms became clear, “The opposition was nearly
unanimous,” he said.
With that
move, it was clear that Mr. Samore needed to move on.
“We had an
honest discussion that I wouldn’t be able to continue to serve as president if
UANI was going to come out against the agreement, since I support it,” Mr.
Samore said.
“Nonetheless,
I support the work that UANI has done in the past to strengthen sanctions, and
I think they will have a role to play in the future to maintain nonnuclear
sanctions if the deal goes forward,” he said. (He will continue to serve on the
group’s advisory board.)
Though he
backs the accord as the most that can be achieved diplomatically, Mr. Samore is
skeptical that the agreement will open a new chapter in American-Iranian
relations.
“The best you
can achieve with diplomacy is delay in the hope that at some point a new
Iranian government emerges that is not committed to developing nuclear
weapons,” he said.
And if that
leadership does not materialize, Mr. Samore acknowledges that Iran might vastly
expand its nuclear enrichment program after core elements of the agreement
expire in 15 years.
He is also
not convinced that Iran will continue to adhere to the accord once economic
sanctions are lifted. Even so, he argues, the accord will put the United States
in a stronger position to respond than a congressional rejection would.
“We will have
bought a couple of years, and if Iran cheats or reneges we will be in an even
better position to double down on sanctions or, if necessary, use military
force,” Mr. Samore said. “If I knew for certain that in five years they would
cheat or renege, I’d still take the deal.”
WASHINGTON —
When the bipartisan advocacy group United Against Nuclear Iran decided last
week to mobilize opposition against the nuclear deal with Tehran, Gary Samore
knew he could no longer serve as its president.
The reason:
After long study, Mr. Samore, a former nuclear adviser toPresident Obama, had
concluded that the accord was in the United States’ interest.
“I think
President Obama’s strategy succeeded,” said Mr. Samore, who left his post on
Monday. “He has created economic leverage and traded it away for Iranian
nuclear concessions.”
As soon as
Mr. Samore left, the group announced a new standard-bearer with a decidedly
different message: Joseph I. Lieberman, the former senator from Connecticut and
the new chairman of the group.
“It’s a bad
deal,” said Mr. Lieberman, who believes that lawmakers have a chance to block
the accord even if that means overcoming a presidential veto. “If the Iranians
are pressured more, I think we can get a better agreement.”
To get that
message across, the group has announced a multimillion-dollar television and
digital media campaign.
Yet it is Mr.
Samore’s quiet departure as president of the organization that is resonating
among the small community of experts who have pored over the agreement.
Mr. Samore
helped establish the organization in 2008, well before serious nuclear talks
were underway. The aim was to strengthen the international economic sanctions
againstIran, which Mr. Samore was
convinced had been mounting a clandestine effort to develop nuclear weapons.
Mr. Samore,
who traveled to Iran in 2005, is well known to the Iranians. At a dinner that
Mr. Samore attended during a meeting of the United Nations General Assembly in
2013, Mohammad Javad Zarif, Iran’s foreign minister, repeated assurances that
Iran’s nuclear efforts were entirely peaceful.
“We are all
united against a nuclear Iran,” he quipped, as he cast a glance at Mr. Samore.
Mr. Samore,
who now runs the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at
Harvard, initially said that the chances of a successful negotiation were dim.
But after the framework of an accord was announced in
Lausanne, Switzerland, in April, he praised it as a good first step.
Mark D.
Wallace, the chief executive of the group and a diplomat in the George W. Bush
administration, said that the organization’s members had sought to keep an open
mind. But after the final terms became clear, “The opposition was nearly
unanimous,” he said.
With that
move, it was clear that Mr. Samore needed to move on.
“We had an
honest discussion that I wouldn’t be able to continue to serve as president if
UANI was going to come out against the agreement, since I support it,” Mr.
Samore said.
“Nonetheless,
I support the work that UANI has done in the past to strengthen sanctions, and
I think they will have a role to play in the future to maintain nonnuclear
sanctions if the deal goes forward,” he said. (He will continue to serve on the
group’s advisory board.)
Though he
backs the accord as the most that can be achieved diplomatically, Mr. Samore is
skeptical that the agreement will open a new chapter in American-Iranian
relations.
“The best you
can achieve with diplomacy is delay in the hope that at some point a new
Iranian government emerges that is not committed to developing nuclear
weapons,” he said.
And if that
leadership does not materialize, Mr. Samore acknowledges that Iran might vastly
expand its nuclear enrichment program after core elements of the agreement
expire in 15 years.
He is also
not convinced that Iran will continue to adhere to the accord once economic
sanctions are lifted. Even so, he argues, the accord will put the United States
in a stronger position to respond than a congressional rejection would.
“We will have
bought a couple of years, and if Iran cheats or reneges we will be in an even
better position to double down on sanctions or, if necessary, use military
force,” Mr. Samore said. “If I knew for certain that in five years they would
cheat or renege, I’d still take the deal.”
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